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ABSTRACT 
This article first analyzes the innovative tort reform of the 
SAFETY Act and then argues for expansion of SAFETY Act type 
risk protection to natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes 
and wildfires. The SAFETY Act was drafted to stimulate the 
development and deployment of technologies that combat terrorism 
by providing liability protection. Applying the same type of 
legislation to natural disasters will provide a commensurate benefit 
of encouraging preparedness and development of technologies that 
could mitigate harms resulting from natural disasters. The 
Department of Homeland Security voiced a desire to increase the 
use of the SAFETY Act by private industry. This article argues that 
one way to increase the utility of the SAFETY Act and provide more 
value for the American public is for Congress to extend SAFETY 
Act protections, by amendment or new legislation, to cover risk 
related to national catastrophes.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Two disasters have defined the turn of the 21st century for the 
nation: the terrorist assault of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) and natural 
disaster Hurricane Katrina. Both events humbled the United States, 
confused the American public, and left its government searching for 
answers and vowing to be better prepared for the next national emergency. 
The events of 9/11 led to the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”), the 9/11 Commission, and a new body of statutes and 
regulations. Reactions to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina similarly led to 
commotion at the Capitol and DHS and also resulted in proposals to better 
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position the country to deal with the next natural catastrophe.2 With respect 
to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, human interference—whether 
public, private, non-governmental organizations or individual—influences a 
nation’s ability to respond and mitigate the gravity of resulting damage.  
¶2 This article analyzes the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering 
Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (“SAFETY Act”)3—one of the 
legislative outgrowths of the events of 9/11—which is incentive-based tort 
reform legislation developed in response to the need for liability protection 
for technologies and services deployed to combat terrorism. As the Under 
Secretary of DHS explained, “[t]he mission of the SAFETY Act is to 
facilitate the development and deployment of qualified anti-terrorism 
technologies by creating a system of risk and litigation management.”4 The 
SAFETY Act ensures “that the threat of liability does not deter potential 
manufacturers or sellers of anti-terrorism technologies from creating or 
providing products and services that could save lives.”5 This article argues 
that risk mitigation and liability protection should be extended to encourage 
the private industry to support governmental efforts to protect the American 
public from the type of destruction resulting from Hurricane Katrina. The 
threat of liability should not deter the efforts of developers or service 
providers from developing technology or systems that minimize harm from 
a catastrophe whether caused by terrorist assault or natural disaster—both 
are beyond human control and are entitled to similar protections. 
I. LIABILITY RISK IN THE WAKE OF TERRORISM 
¶3 The SAFETY Act is a landmark tort reform addressing the concern 
that potential legal exposure would discourage the development, production 
                                                     
2 See generally A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT 
BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE 
TO HURRICANE KATRINA (2006), 
http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm. 
3 Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 
U.S.C. §§ 441–44 (2006). 
4 Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Management, Integration and Oversight of 
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Jay M. 
Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of 
Homeland Security) available at https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf 
(follow “Under Secretary’s Testimony” hyperlink in left column) (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Testimony]. 
5 Id.; see also Implementing the SAFETY Act: Advancing New Technologies for 
Homeland Security: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 
108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement by Comm. Chair Rep. Davis) (“By passing the 
SAFETY Act, Congress acted quickly to resolve uncertainty over liability 
concerns so that the full power of the American technology could be unleashed 
in the war on terrorism.”).  
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and deployment of new technologies needed to protect the United States 
from the consequences of an “act of terrorism.”6 The SAFETY Act defines 
the term “act of terrorism” broadly to include any unlawful act “designed or 
intended to cause mass destruction, injury or other loss to citizens or 
institutions of the United States.”7 Following 9/11, the uncertainties related 
to the hazards of terrorism and the exposure to massive liabilities meant that 
many hopeful developers and providers of anti-terrorism products could not 
obtain reasonable insurance, even with the passage of the Terrorist Risk 
Insurance Act.8 This lack of liability coverage and the tremendous risk it 
caused could be perceived as an impediment to the optimal development 
and deployment of crucial counter-terrorism technologies. In response, the 
SAFETY Act was created to stimulate private industry to create, develop 
and use proven anti-terrorism products and services by eliminating or 
minimizing unlimited exposure to liability should their products allegedly 
fail to prevent, deter, or mitigate a terrorist act.9 The SAFETY Act affords 
risk management and litigation management protections for the sellers or 
providers of qualified anti-terrorism technologies and others throughout the 
supply, distribution, and user chain in the event of an act of terrorism.10 In 
sum, the SAFETY Act encourages the development and deployment of anti-
terrorism technologies (“ATTs”) that would substantially enhance the 
protection of the United States.11 
¶4 Even before the events of 9/11, various industries were subject to 
civil liability following a terrorist attack. In the civil litigation following the 
Pan American flight bombing, a jury found that willful misconduct on the 
part of Pan American Airline permitted terrorists to plant the bomb on 
Flight 103.12 Similarly, during the first bombing of the World Trade Center, 
a court held the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey liable for failure to 
                                                     
6 See Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering 
Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147, 
33,154 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25) (defining “acts of 
terrorism” to also cover acts that occur outside of the U.S. so long as the act 
causes harm to a person, property, or entity in the United States).  
7 Regulations to Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies, 6 
C.F.R. § 25.2 (2007). 
8 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(2002). 
9 SAFETY Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441–44 (2006). 
10 SAFETY Act, Encouraging the Development of Anti-Terrorism 
Technologies, https://www.safetyact.gov (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
11 Id. 
12 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot., 811 F. Supp. 84, 87–89 (E.D.N.Y. 
1992) (holding Pan AM not liable). But see Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives USA 
Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 620 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding terrorists were a supervening, 
unforeseen cause). 
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implement prior vulnerability assessment recommendations.13 However, the 
court did not hold the fertilizer manufacturer of the material used to 
detonate the homemade bomb liable, because it found the manufacturer did 
not have a duty to the public to prevent terrorists from using ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer.14 
¶5 The aftermath of 9/11 established that civil liability associated with 
a terrorist attack could be staggering. New York City suffered over $16 
billion in losses above insurance and federal emergency monies.15 The 
families choosing not to sue the numerous potential defendants received 
billions in compensation from the Victim Compensation Fund pursuant to 
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001.16 
Others not receiving compensation from the fund could pursue and recover 
under common law tort for damages for personal loss, business interruption 
and economic loss. 
¶6 In the notable 9/11 tort case, a federal district court determined that 
airports, security companies, an airline manufacturer, the World Trade 
Center and the New York/New Jersey Port Authority had a duty to the 
public at large to prepare for an Act of Terror and permitted wrongful death 
suits filed on behalf of decedents of 9/11 attacks.17 The defendants, in a 
motion to dismiss, claimed they owed no duty to the plaintiffs because they 
“could not reasonably have anticipated that terrorists would hijack several 
jumbo jet airplanes and crash them, killing passengers, crew, thousands on 
the ground, and themselves.”18 In denying the motion, the court found that 
the possibility of terrorist attacks was foreseeable and the airline companies, 
security companies and airport operators had a duty under New York, 
                                                     
13 In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 709 N.E.2d 452, 455 (N.Y. 1999) 
(stating the result of the Appellate division, which was reversed in this decision). 
14 Port Auth. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 317 (3d Cir. 1999). 
15 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. 02-700R, IMPACT OF 
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER 22 (2002). 
16 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). “The Fund will have processed more than 7,300 death 
and personal injury claims by its closing on June 15, 2004, accounting for 
claims on behalf of more than 98 percent of those who lost their lives on 
September 11, 2001.” In re Sept. 11th Litig., No. 21 MC97 (AKH), slip op. at 3 
(S.D.N.Y June 10, 2004). Civilians killed or seriously injured received a total of 
$8.7 billion, averaging about $3.1 million per recipient. Most of this came from 
the Victim Compensation Fund, but payments also came from insurance 
companies, employers and charities. See LLOYD DIXON AND RACHEL KAGANOFF 
STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACK, (RAND 
Corporation 2004). 
17 In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that 
the September 11th attacks were “foreseeable”).  
18 Id. at 287. 
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Virginia, and Pennsylvania law to the ground victims.19 The court also 
found that the Port Authorities and the World Trade Center operator had 
duties to the building occupants and, relying on Virginia and Pennsylvania 
law, permitted the product liability claims to continue against Boeing 
Corp.20 The district court sent a clear message to the private sector that it 
should be on guard against an act of terrorism by finding the private sector 
has a duty to the public to be properly prepared.21  
¶7 Potential claimants after an act of terrorism are plentiful: survivors, 
representatives of victims, property owners, municipalities, non-
governmental organizations, insurers of property, and businesses.22 Even 
though the public and private sector share in the reputational risks, it is only 
the private sector carrying the risk of tort litigation. The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity limits the government’s legal liability for harms related 
to disaster planning and response. With the passage of the SAFETY Act, 
Congress extended this immunity, allowing protection of private parties 
from legal liability while encouraging the discovery and implementation of 
anti-terrorist devices and services that could save lives and minimize 
damage. 
II. THE SAFETY ACT 
¶8 Since the inception of the SAFETY Act and the promulgation of the 
interim SAFETY Act regulations by DHS in 2003, over one hundred ATTs 
have been designated and/or certified under the SAFETY Act.23 Most of 
these technology applications and SAFETY Act awards, however, are new 
developments, and DHS has acknowledged that the SAFETY Act is an 
underutilized tool holding more promise as a mechanism to stimulate 
technology to battle terrorism.24 To spur more anti-terrorism innovation, 
DHS amended the regulations to clarify the broad range of protection and 
                                                     
19 Id. at 295–97. 
20 Id. at 300–01, 310. 
21 See id. at 287. 
22 See Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack: 
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l 
Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of 
Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care–Public Health Issues), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041068t.pdf (relating the death of nearly 3,000 
people and the exposure of an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 people to a mixture 
of dust, debris, smoke and various chemicals). 
23 See 6 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2006) (detailing the process for SAFETY Act 
certification). 
24 Testimony, supra note 4 (“I believe we can more fully utilize what is an 
important homeland security tool.”). 
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potential beneficiaries under the SAFETY Act.25 On June 8, 2006, three and 
a half years after the interim rules, DHS promulgated the final SAFETY Act 
regulations,26 and on August 16, 2006, DHS posted a new SAFETY Act 
Application Kit on its website which refined and clarified the final rules 
with the intent to encourage more applications under the SAFETY Act.27 
¶9 Under the SAFETY Act there are two distinct sets of protections: 
Designation and Certification. To receive protections under the SAFETY 
Act, a seller or provider of “anti-terror technologies” must complete a 
comprehensive SAFETY Act Application Kit, which includes, among other 
documentation, a detailed description of the technology, information about 
terrorism insurance coverage, the benefits to the public, and the need for 
coverage.28 Qualified anti-terrorism technology (“QATT”), the technology 
entitled to coverage, is broadly defined to include, “any product, equipment, 
service (including support services), device, or technology (including 
information technology) designed, developed, modified, procured, or sold 
for the purpose of preventing, detecting, identifying, or deterring acts of 
terrorism or limiting the harm such acts might otherwise cause.”29 A 
“seller” of a QATT is defined as, “any person, firm, or other entity that sells 
or otherwise provides Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology to any 
customer(s) [which includes internal deployment]30 and to whom or to 
                                                     
25 Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,147, 33,148 
(June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25) (“Shortly after being sworn in, 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff stated: ‘There is more 
opportunity, much more opportunity, to take advantage of this important law, 
and we are going to do that.’”). 
26 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,168. The final rule also provides for a block Designation or 
block Certification so that SAFETY Act protections apply for an entire category 
of QATTs based upon performance standards. 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,156-57. 
27 The Application Kit can be found by following the “Application Kit” 
hyperlink at http://www.safetyact.gov. 
28 Completed Application Kits are submitted, usually electronically, to the 
SAFETY Act office. Safety Act Application Login, 
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Register?ReadForm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2007). 
29 6 C.F.R. §25.2 (2007). The definitions further establish that design services, 
threat assessments, vulnerability studies, and other analyses relevant to 
homeland security may be deemed a technology under the Act. Id. 
30 The term “customer” is broad and means the recipient or user of the QATT. A 
single entity may be both the “Seller” and the customer in the event such entity 
is deploying its QATT internally. SAFETY Act Application Kit at 13, 
http://www.safetyact.gov (follow “Application Kit” hyperlink). 
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which (as appropriate) a Designation and/or Certification has been issued 
under this Part . . . .”31 
¶10 Following review and approval of an application for SAFETY Act 
coverage, DHS confers either a Designation or the more comprehensive 
Certification.32 The benefits of receiving a Designation award include: (1) 
an exclusive federal cause of action and federal court jurisdiction;33 (2) 
liability caps at a level such that purchased protection does not unduly affect 
the price of the technology (usually capped at the amount of liability 
insurance);34 (3) no joint and several liability for non-economic damages, 
(4) no punitive damages or prejudgment interest35 and, (5) plaintiffs’ 
recovery is reduced by any amounts collected from insurance or other 
collateral sources.36 
¶11 In the case of Certification, an applicant receives the same benefits 
as a Designation and an additional level of protection in the form of a 
rebuttable presumption that the Seller is entitled to the “Government 
Contractor Defense” (“GCD”), which extends governmental immunity to 
the applicant.37 Entitlement to GCD means that if a private party has 
contracted with the federal government to carry out a project, then that 
private party, like the federal government, is shielded from liability under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. GCD was originally a judicially-created 
extension of governmental immunity to those entities providing the federal 
government with products and/or services for which the government had 
                                                     
31 6 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2007). 
32 See 6 C.F.R. § 25.4(b) (2007) (describing the criteria the Under Secretary may 
use when evaluating technology). 
33 6 U.S.C. § 442(a) (2006). In developing the regulations, DHS clarified that the 
federal cause of action can only be brought for claims or injuries that are 
proximately caused by sellers that provide the QATT and that the cause of 
action cannot be brought against buyers, buyer’s contractors, suppliers or any 
downstream users. Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by 
Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 
33,147, 33,150 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25). 
34 6 U.S.C. § 443(c) (2006). A Designation is made contingent upon the Seller’s 
acquisition and maintenance of reasonable insurance coverage as required by 
DHS. 6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(1). The liability of the Seller cannot be in an amount 
greater than the limits of liability insurance coverage required to be maintained 
by the Seller as set forth by DHS in the Designation. 6 U.S.C. § 443(c). The 
amount of coverage is not prescriptive and is determined by DHS based upon 
the “maximum amount of liability insurance reasonably available from private 
sources on the world market at prices and terms that will not unreasonably 
distort the sales price” of the QATT. 6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(2). 
35 6 U.S.C. § 442(b)(1) (2006); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2007). 
36 6 U.S.C. § 442(c) (2006); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2007). 
37 6 U.S.C. § 442(d) (2006); 6 C.F.R. § 25.8 (2007). 
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created or adopted the specifications,38 but the SAFETY Act’s express 
terms supplant the requirements in the case law with the application of the 
defense.39 In essence, the SAFETY Act codifies the protections afforded by 
the Government Contractor Defense.40 Furthermore, any claims against 
such sellers of a certified QATT arising out of acts of terrorism are subject 
to presumptive dismissal unless fraud or knowing and willful misconduct in 
submitting information to DHS in the application process is established by 
clear and convincing evidence.41 
¶12 Designation is a prerequisite for Certification and generally, sellers 
apply for both at the same time.42 In determining whether to issue 
Certification, the Under Secretary of DHS conducts a comprehensive 
review of the design of the QATT and determines whether: (1) it will 
perform as intended, (2) conforms to the seller’s specifications and (3) is 
safe for use as intended.43 Receiving a Designation without a Certification 
award may mean that the seller or provider could not demonstrate that the 
QATT will “perform as intended.”44 A party awarded with Certification 
will receive a “Certificate of Conformance,” and will be published on the 
“Approved Product List,” which is maintained by the Office of Safety Act 
Implementation.45 
                                                     
38 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988) (holding that 
contractors may assert an affirmative defense to product liability and other tort 
liability when (1) the U.S. approved reasonably precise design specifications, (2) 
the equipment conformed to those specifications and (3) the contractor warned 
the government about relevant dangers known to it, that were previously 
unknown to the government). 
39 Unlike GCD, in the case of a certified QATT, the affirmative statutory 
defense will be determined by whether the technology conforms to the 
technology description as defined by the Seller (versus the government), will 
apply to all sales to anyone, including internal deployment (the Government 
need not be involved) and will remain in effect ad infinitum for sales made 
during the period of the QATT designation. Regulations Implementing the 
Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the 
SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147, 33,150 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 
C.F.R. pt. 25). 
40 6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(1). 
41 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,153-54.  
42 6 C.F.R. § 25.9(a) (2007) (stating that “[s]uch applications may be filed 
simultaneously . . .”). 
43 6 C.F.R. § 25.2. (2007). 
44 See 6 C.F.R. § 25.8(a) (2007) (stating that a prerequisite to certification is a 
finding that the technology will “perform as intended”). 
45 Recent SAFETY Act Designations/Certifications, 
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Awards?ReadForm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2007). 
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¶13 To date, DHS has awarded Certification for hardware, software, 
services and methodologies for a wide variety of ATTs. The technologies 
include: biological detection and collection systems; vehicle and cargo 
inspection systems for palletized and other bulk cargo; threat and 
vulnerability assessment methodologies for cargo containers at ports; 
situational awareness systems for shore-based port security and traffic 
control; countermeasures planning methodologies; screening and 
identification systems for trace explosives found on baggage, packages or 
people; explosive detection canines; physical security and force protection 
services; and support services for the US VISIT program.46 
¶14 Thus, the SAFETY Act, with the promulgation of the refined final 
rules and the new Application Kit, provides a significant user-friendly tool 
encouraging the private sector to pursue technologies that will fight the war 
on terror without fear of unlimited liability exposure. When companies 
receive an award for developments preventing or deterring breaches of 
security, the general public and company stockholders benefit because the 
added security protects against all acts, whether acts of terrorism, accident 
or wrongdoing.47  
¶15 The SAFETY Act also helps to improve security and safety 
standards for industries. If one company takes advantage of the SAFETY 
Act’s liability protection by improving its security and safety standards, 
then other companies arguably strive to meet the same standards in order to 
prevent allegations that they failed to meet the industry standard of care. In 
receiving an award for developments preventing or deterring breaches of 
security, companies receive the direct benefit of security against all acts, 
whether acts of terrorism, accidents or wrongdoing. This adds to the 
companies’ value not only to the general public, but to the stockholders as 
well.48 
                                                     
46 Id. 
47 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF THE INCREASED RISK OF 
TERRORIST OR OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH POSTING OFF-
SITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET (April 18, 
2000), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/doj/dojinternetinfo041800.pdf; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. GAO-03-24R, SECURITY OF CHEMICAL 
FACILITIES 4 (2002) (discussing “the extent to which the Clean Air Act’s 
accidental release regulations have resulted in actions that are effective in 
detecting, preventing, and minimizing the consequences of releases of regulated 
substances that may be caused by criminal and terrorist activity”). 
48 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 47; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 47. 
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III. THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY EXAMPLE 
¶16 Companies involved in the business of homeland security, whether 
as developers or manufacturers of ATTs or providing professional services, 
will benefit from the protections offered under the SAFETY Act. Chemical 
facilities and oil companies make products vital to medicine, public health, 
energy, and the military and are part of the United States’ critical 
infrastructure.49 They also employ millions of people and support the 
communities in which they operate. As such, they are not only profit-driven 
companies, but also contain national critical assets that need to be protected. 
¶17 The oil and chemical industries were identified as terrorist targets as 
part of the critical infrastructure due to the great economic and/or physical 
harm that could be caused by attack.50 Furthermore, trends in international 
and domestic terrorism and burgeoning interest in weapons of mass 
destruction portend of potential targeting of chemical facilities.51 The 
Department of Justice has warned that an attempt in the foreseeable future 
to cause chemical release is real and credible.52 Chemical plants are an 
attractive target for terrorists intent on causing massive damage.53 A 
terrorist attack involving theft or release of certain chemicals could 
significantly impact the health and safety of millions of Americans, disrupt 
local or regional economies, and impact other critical infrastructures (e.g., 
drinking water and wastewater treatment).54  
¶18 Threats to chemical plants and the energy industry are not new. In 
the late 1990s, domestic terrorists plotted to destroy a U.S. facility with 
millions of gallons of propane.55 Terrorists have also targeted chemical 
facilities in Europe.56 On May 15, 2005, suspected Basque separatists 
                                                     
49See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION PLAN 17-18 (2006), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 39. 
52 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 47; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 47.  
53 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS 65–66 
(2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html. 
54 Id. 
55 Mark Gladstone, 2 Men Held in Alleged Plot to Bomb N. California Sites, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at AI. 
56 Four Small Bombs Explode in Spain, USATODAY.COM, May 15, 2005, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-05-15-spain-
blasts_x.htm. 
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detonated heavy explosives in a paint factory and a metal works facility in 
Spain.57 
¶19 The new challenges of a terrorist threat added to traditional security 
concerns for chemical and oil companies of theft, vandalism, employee 
violence, and emergency response. Since September 11, 2001, the chemical 
industry has made tremendous strides in improving the security of its 
facilities from acts of terrorism. Members of the American Chemistry 
Council (“ACC”) and the Synthetic Organic Chemicals Manufacturers 
Association completed site vulnerability assessments and implemented 
security improvements at their plants commensurate with such risks.58 The 
ACC also established a recognized security program, the Responsible 
Care® Security Code of Management Practices, which sets the standard for 
handling security at chemical facilities. ACC member companies claim to 
have spent over $3 billion in security measures and are continually 
improving their approach to preventing, deterring or mitigating the 
possibility of an act of terrorism. 
¶20 The recently published regulations allow sellers of anti-terror 
services and integrated systems to seek protections in one application for 
multiple component services and products that can work in concert together 
to combat terrorism, such as the security measures implemented at a 
chemical security plant. These regulations reaffirm possible protection to 
the expansive range of potential security measures deployed at oil and 
chemical facilities. Such measures include: anti-terrorism equipment and 
devices, consulting services, engineering services, threat assessments, 
vulnerability studies and other analyses relevant to homeland security.59  
¶21 The SAFETY Act protections deserve to be awarded to proactive 
oil and chemical companies meeting their specifications for anti-terrorist 
security measures and setting standards for other companies.60 It may be 
                                                     
57 Id. 
58 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. GAO-03-439, 
HOMELAND SECURITY: VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES ARE UNDER WAY AT 
CHEMICAL FACILITIES, BUT THE EXTENT OF SECURITY PREPAREDNESS IS 
UNKNOWN 23–24 (2003). 
59 Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147, 33153–54 
(June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25). 
60 See Recent SAFETY Act Designations, 
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Designations?ReadForm (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2007) (listing, for example, the Dow Chemical Company for its 
Dow Chemical Facility Security Services, a comprehensive set of services 
designed to enhance security and protect key assets); Recent SAFETY Act 
Designations/Certifications, 
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Awards?ReadForm, (last visited 
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financially demanding to develop innovative and effective security 
safeguards, however, SAFETY Act protections set off some of the expenses 
to companies and also advance national security by producing and 
demonstrating proven effective security technologies. A recent study by 
Stanford University in partnership with the National Association of 
Manufacturers showed there is also a business case to be made for 
addressing security.61  
IV. OTHER TORT REFORM LEGISLATION 
¶22 Elements of the SAFETY Act are similar to other protections 
afforded by legislation resulting from 9/11. The Air Transportation Safety 
and System Stabilization Act provided exclusive federal jurisdiction for 
torts arising out of the 9/11 events and limited liability of certain defendants 
to their insurance coverage.62 Unlike the SAFETY Act, the Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act only applies to 9/11 
actions and only to those who opted out of the Victim Compensation 
Fund.63 The act does not afford coverage related to future assaults, and even 
though it is likely that Congress will follow a similar approach following 
another fateful day, the protections would have more value if they were in 
place now.  
¶23 Vaccines and other countermeasures to prevent pandemic outbreaks 
received protections similar to those found in the SAFETY Act. In 
December 2005, President Bush signed into law the Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”),64 which provides broad legal 
liability protection to private companies involved in the production and 
                                                                                                                       
Nov. 4, 2007) (listing, for example, the Wackenhut Corporation for its 
Consulting and Risk Management Services, which is a vulnerability assessment 
and countermeasure planning tool for public and private sector customer; Triple 
Canopy Inc. for its Security Assessment Services, which identify physical and 
operational vulnerabilities at various facilities, including critical infrastructure, 
and recommend mitigation in a comprehensive security plan; Securitas 
Holdings, Inc. for its Security Services, which are described as a total security 
solution for buildings, facilities, and other operations and infrastructure, using 
an array of services and technologies uniquely tailored to customer needs).  
61 Barchi Peleg-Gillai, Gauri Bhat and Lesley Sept, Innovators in Supply Chain 
Security: Better Security Drives Business Value, THE MANUFACTURING 
INNOVATION SERIES, at 1 (July 2006), available at 
http://www.nam.org/s_nam/index.asp (click on “Research and Reports” under 
“The Manufacturing Institute” in the left column). 
62 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 
408(a)–(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001) (amended by Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201, 115 Stat. 597, 45 (2001)). 
63 Id. 
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d to -6e (2006). 
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distribution of pandemic and epidemic products and other covered 
“countermeasures.”65 The PREP Act was modeled after the SAFETY Act. 
In the event the Health and Human Services Department Secretary declares 
a public health emergency as a result of disease or other health condition, it 
provides statutory-based immunity (a rebuttable presumption) to 
manufacturers and providers of drugs, vaccines, biological devices and 
products, and treatment authorized for use in diagnosing, mitigating, 
preventing, treating or curing a pandemic or epidemic.66 The immunity 
applies automatically to covered countermeasures and there is no reference 
to the Government Contractor Defense or any other precedent or immunity 
theory within the plain language of the PREP Act. Like the SAFETY Act, 
the only exception to the immunity is in the case of willful misconduct.67 
Unlike the SAFETY Act, however, the PREP Act also requires the 
establishment of a compensation fund for potential victims of a pandemic or 
epidemic whose injuries were caused by using the covered product.68  
V. THE NEED TO EXTEND SAFETY ACT TYPE TORT REFORM TO 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
¶24 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita led to unprecedented damage, rivaling 
9/11 with respect to economic and personal loss and impact on the United 
States.69 Hurricane Katrina affected over half of a million people, caused 
the death of over 1,300 people and displaced an entire city’s population. It 
also left standing water in high temperatures, causing a breeding ground for 
disease and environmental challenges.70 Both hurricanes caused enormous 
concern for environmental and public health because of the release of 
untreated sewage with debris and sludge throughout affected towns; 
compromised public water supplies; the release and dispersion of oil, 
                                                     
65 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)–(b). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)–(d). 
68 The fund’s purpose is to provide “timely, uniform, and adequate 
compensation to eligible individuals for covered injuries directly caused by the 
administration or use of covered countermeasure pursuant to such declaration.” 
The legislation, however, does not appropriate any money for the fund. 42 
U.S.C. § 247d-6e(a). 
69 See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post–9/11 Economy: The 
Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 435, 467 (2005) (analyzing terrorism risk and arguing, even before 
Hurricane Katrina, that the “greatest risk of exogenous shock to the industry is 
from a natural mega-catastrophe”). 
70 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. GAO-05-1053T, 
HURRICANE KATRINA: PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF THE NATION’S PREPAREDNESS, 
RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051053t.pdf. 
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 7 
petroleum and industrial chemicals; and the contamination of buildings with 
mold and rot.71 Extensive wetland and forest resources were severely 
damaged as was much of the critical energy infrastructure.72 Katrina also 
surpassed 9/11 as the largest insurance loss arising out of a single event.73 
Insurance losses were estimated at $34.4 billion and did not include the 
potential economic consequences.74 
¶25 The aftermath of the hurricanes demonstrated the inadequacies of 
the United States’ emergency management system in responding to natural 
and catastrophic disasters.75 The Secretary of DHS, Michael Chertoff, 
admitted that in addition to inter-agency disputes and lack of coordination, 
governmental agencies lacked “the skill set” to fulfill preparedness 
functions.76 Much has already been done to repair the system so that the 
United States will be better prepared for the next catastrophic disaster.77 
However, the criticism of federal, state and local governments spawned the 
recognition that the private sector was a great source of knowledge and 
assets for emergency preparedness and response and the private sector 
needed to be involved.78 Private companies had hurricane crisis 
                                                     
71 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NEEDS & 
HABITABILITY ASSESSMENT JOINT TASKFORCE: HURRICANE KATRINA RESPONSE 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT 12–16 (2005), available at 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hurricanes/katrina/pdf/envassessment.pdf. 
72 Id. 
73 Edmund L. Andrews, Hurricane Expected To Cost Government Up To $100 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005. Asbestos liability has produced the single 
greatest largest insurance loss but it is related to a product and is not a one-time 
event. See Holborn Corporation, Katrina: Market Insured Losses (Sept. 21, 
2005), http://partners.holborn.com/holborn/reports/katrina09-21-
2005/Katrina2005.pdf. 
74 Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance after Hurricane Katrina: 
A Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 
591 (2006) (citing Press Release, ISO Prop. Claims Servs., Preliminary Estimate 
Puts Insured Losses from Hurricane Katrina at $34.4 Billion (Oct. 4, 2005)). 
75 See William L. Waugh Jr., The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and 
Rita Disasters, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10 (2006) (discussing 
recommendations to repair the National Emergency Management System and 
correct other issues regarding federal, state and local response to disasters). 
76 Evan Thomas, What the Hell is Going On?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 2005, at 
54–55. 
77 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, S. 3721, 109th Cong. 
(2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3721. 
78 Rhee, supra note 69, at 605–06 (inquiring as to what may have been the result 
or “how many lives could have been saved during the Hurricane Katrina crisis if 
a corporate-like management team with a clear mandate, supported by the 
authority and virtually unlimited resources of the state and federal governments, 
had been tasked with the disaster preparedness and relief efforts”). 
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management plans in place years before the storm and began preparing for 
the worst days well ahead of time.79 Immediately after the storms, these 
companies resumed operations even in the most devastated areas.80 
Companies such as Wal-Mart and The Dow Chemical Company worked 
both with the government and independently to provide charitable services 
and support.81 Public service is the responsibility of the government, which 
is today, as exemplified by Hurricane Katrina, ultimately a result of the 
government’s interconnectedness with private corporations and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the future of public service 
therefore depends on how the government manages its relationship with its 
private partners.82 
¶26 The private sector is situated to make very substantial contributions 
to the safety and security of the United States. A SAFETY Act type of 
coverage would ensure the threat of liability and lack of insurance coverage 
would not deter potential developers and providers of natural disaster 
preparedness and response tools from developing or commercializing their 
technologies and services that could reduce the risks of harm or mitigate the 
effects of a grave natural disaster. As such, Congress should consider either 
(1) amending the SAFETY Act to include grave “natural disasters,” or (2) 
promulgating new legislation modeled on the SAFETY Act. Such actions 
would improve private sector activity to help protect the public from the 
effects of natural disasters.  
                                                     
79 See Justin Fox, A Meditation on Risk: Hurricane Katrina Brought Out the 
Worst in Washington and the Best in Business, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 50. As 
an example, the Dow Chemical Company (including its affiliated companies) 
posted a communication days before landfall on its website at 
http://www.down.com/facilities/namerica/plaquemi/news/20050829a.htm. 
80 Press Release, The Dow Chemical Company, Dow Completes Preliminary 
Assessment of Gulf Coast Sites (Sept. 24, 2005), 
http://news.dow.com/dow_news/corporate/2005/20050924a.htm; Press Release 
from Office of the Press Secretary of Homeland Security, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland Security Announces First 
Designations and Certifications Under the Safety Act (June 18, 2004), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0438.shtm. 
81 See, e.g., The Dow Chemical Company, Dow and UCC Respond to Employee 
and Community Needs in Louisiana During Hurricane Katrina Aftermath, 
http://www.dow.com/facilities/namerica/laops/katrina/index.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2007) (providing links to new releases about Dow and Union Carbide 
Corporation’s response to needs in Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina 
aftermath); Michael Barbaro and Justin Gillis, Wal-Mart at Forefront of 
Hurricane Relief, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at D01. 
82 See DONALD F. KETTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 118 (The Johns 
Hopkins University Press 2002). 
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¶27 As part of any tort reform, Congress should recognize that 
compensation funds must be established for injured individuals. The Victim 
Compensation Fund for 9/11 families provided the necessary financial 
support for the survivors and representatives of the victims,83 and it is likely 
Congress will follow the precedent of previous reforms and create a fund 
for victims in the event of another terrorist attack. Nevertheless, responsible 
legislation should mandate the creation and funding of a compensation fund 
commensurate with the reduction of exposure allotted by the legislation and 
strike a reasonable balance between bolstering U.S. preparedness and 
response and compensating those who may be harmed. Further, a 
compensation fund would reduce the likelihood of litigation risk where 
every non-compensated victim will seek recourse under various theories 
based upon loopholes or gaps in the legislation. 
¶28 We can examine one of the certified QATTs as an example of the 
benefits of extending SAFETY Act type coverage to natural disasters. One 
of the first sellers to receive SAFETY Act coverage was the Lockheed 
Martin Corporation for their Risk Assessment Platform.84 The “automated, 
threat-based Risk Assessment Platform is an integrated computer system 
that provides near real-time, event-driven terrorism threat analysis, allowing 
the focus of resources on the most imminent threats and greatest risks.”85 
This QATT “enables effective, responsible sharing of information between 
private industry and the government through continuous independent 
auditing of compliance with policies governing access, use, and distribution 
of information.”86 Development of a similar integrated computer system 
that provides near real-time natural disaster (earthquakes, hurricanes, 
wildfires, etc.) risk analysis on imminent threats and facilitating information 
sharing between public and private bodies would be a great benefit. 
Furthermore, comparable to the security vulnerability assessment and 
security measures implemented by chemical plants and oil companies, 
integrated systems assessing the vulnerability to natural disasters, enacting 
natural disaster security and safety plans, and espousing tested 
comprehensive emergency response capabilities would also be of value to 
society. An extension of SAFETY Act-type incentives, protections and 
approval would encourage the increased development and use of such 
technologies and tools. Awards must be given to those whose technologies 
or services are intended to benefit the public and the assets of the United 
                                                     
83 See James R. Copland, Tragic Solutions: The 9/11 Victim Compensation 
Fund, Historical Antecedents, and Lessons for Tort Reform, CTR. FOR LEGAL 
POLICY AT THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE 22-24 (2005), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/clpwp_01-13-05.pdf. 
84 Department of Homeland Security Announces First Designations and 
Certifications Under the Safety Act, supra note 80. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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States. However, profitability, corporate responsibility and the reputation of 
a company should be contributing factors. 
¶29 The private sector possesses the best expertise and know-how to 
develop and discover technology and services to assist the government in 
responding to natural disasters.87 By allowing the private sector to develop 
the technology or service, test it, and submit its innovation to the 
government, both the public and private sector benefit. For example, a 
warning system or other innovative detection devices or preparedness and 
response systems could have provided a great benefit when, on December 
26, 2004, an undersea earthquake rated at a 9.0 magnitude on the Richter 
scale88 triggered the recent tsunami in South Asia, causing the death of 
280,000 people.  
¶30 Congress provisionally recognized, following Hurricane Katrina, 
that SAFETY Act type reform should be applied to all disasters, whether 
man-made or nature-made. After Katrina, Congress considered a “good 
Samaritan” tort-reform legislation,—the Gulf Coast Recovery Act 
(“GCRA”)—intended to provide insulation against liability for contractors 
involved in disaster relief and reconstruction.89 The rationale espoused by 
the drafters of the GCRA was to protect those involved in relief efforts after 
the hurricanes.90 The findings in the GCRA noted the admirable behavior of 
the response workers who answered the call on September 11, 2001 and 
who are now facing litigation for their Good Samaritan actions without 
insulation from liability.91 Congress intended for the GCRA to protect the 
                                                     
87 See Steven L. Schooner & Erin Siuda-Pfeffer, Post-Katrina Reconstruction 
Liability: Exposing the Inferior Risk-Barrier, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 326 
(2006). 
88 See U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquake Hazards Program, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
89 Gulf Coast Recovery Act, S. 1761, 109th Cong. (2005). 
90 Oversight Hearing on the Impact of Certain Governmental Contractor 
Liability Proposals on Environmental Laws: Hearing on S.1761 Before the 
Subcomm. on Superfund and Waste Management of the S. Comm. on 
Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Sen. John 
Thune) (“Because large-scale disaster recovery in the Fulg Coast Region doesn’t 
occur in a vacuum, I strongly believe that Congress should provide private 
contractors with a measurable level of liability protections due to the nature of 
the work they do in helping the government restore the basic services the public 
expects and deserves.”). 
91 Gulf Coast Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 4438, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (The 
covered contractors should be those who “answered the call on September 11, 
2001, and in the following weeks and months, working hand-in-hand with 
Federal, State, and local officials to rescue the survivors of the terrorist attacks 
on that historic date, to recover the bodies of those who died, to remove 
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response workers in the Gulf Coast by protecting against the liability of the 
9/11 contractors. Although Congress modeled the GCRA after the SAFETY 
Act, its intentions fell short in that it focused too narrowly on “contractors” 
already providing relief work and the intent to protect such recovery and 
relief workers.92 The GCRA became more of a recognition award rather 
than an incentive award and was singularly drafted to address the then-
current situation in the Gulf Coast. Furthermore, the GCRA did not 
establish a compensation fund for the victims, which would be a vital part 
of any legislative effort to expand the SAFETY Act to natural disasters. A 
true expansion of the SAFETY Act to cover severe natural conditions 
would require applying protections encouraging the development of 
countermeasures that would reduce the ultimate harm to the public as well 
as those awarding Good Samaritan behavior. 
VI. TORT LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR NATURAL DISASTERS IS 
CONSISTENT WITH RELATED TRENDS AND LAWS  
¶31 The concept of expanding the SAFETY Act’s protections to natural 
disasters is not a new concept, but rather a logical continuation of legislative 
initiatives designed to adapt to the post 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina world. 
¶32 The limitation of legal liability for administrative enforcement 
actions arising out of “acts of God” or natural disasters as well as “acts of 
war” already exists in over 50 federal law exemptions.93 The exemptions 
span from categorical exemptions for any damages arising out of acts of war 
or God to specific exemptions allowing for certain behaviors without 
recourse during weather disasters or in the interest of national security.94 
These exemptions allow the President or authorized designees, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), to exempt, suspend or modify 
requirements without risk of enforcement actions in times of emergency or 
                                                                                                                       
mountains of debris, to reconstruct the Pentagon, and ultimately, to restore some 
sense of normalcy to New York City and Arlington, Virginia.”). 
92 See Schooner, supra note 87 (arguing that the GRCA would inappropriately 
place the cost of accidents or negligence on the victims or uncovered relief 
workers and that the immunity of liability for contractors contravenes basic 
good government principles). 
93 Letter from Lynn L. Bergeson, Chair of the American Bar Association Section 
of Environment, Energy, and Resources, to Stephen L. Johnson, United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/environ/katrina/Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 
2007) (commenting on “the breadth and efficacy of existing exemptions in our 
federal environmental laws and regulations). 
94 Id. 
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national security.95 These exemptions to enforcement actions also work to 
preclude citizen suits brought to enforce the same regulations or statutes.96 
¶33 The Stafford Act also vests federal agencies with the power to 
appoint “temporary personnel” in the event of a public health emergency or 
disaster.97 This broad grant of authority permits federal agencies, such as 
the DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) or the 
Department of Human and Health Services (“HHS”), to appoint personnel 
in advance of or following a disaster to carry out disaster-relief efforts.98 
Also, the Secretary of HHS is specifically authorized to appoint individuals 
to serve as intermittent disaster-response personnel of the National Disaster 
Medical System (“NDMS”) in accordance with applicable laws.99 
Intermittent disaster-response personnel are granted the same immunity 
from civil liability available to employees of the U.S. Public Health 
Service.100 This means that suits cannot be brought against intermittent 
disaster-response personnel; rather, such suits are brought against the 
United States and will be defended by the U.S. Attorney General.101 On 
August 31, 2005, the Secretary of HHS declared a public health emergency 
in the Gulf region,102 thus setting the foundation for civil liability 
protections for health disaster personnel.  
¶34 In the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act,103 vessel owners are 
afforded a defense to tort claims following an act of terror or a natural 
disaster limiting their liability to the value of the ship and its pending freight 
after casualty so long as they did not have “privity” or “knowledge.”104 
Therefore, a terrorist bomb or a hurricane that virtually flattens a private 
vessel and destroys the contents could arguably render the ship worthless 
                                                     
95 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C § 1321(c) (2006) (creating exemption for oil and 
hazardous substances discharges into U.S. waters during disasters and in the 
interest of national security); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2006) (providing defenses to 
liability for acts of God or war). 
96 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(4); 42 U.S.C. 9607(b).
97 42 U.S.C. § 5149(b) (2006). 
98 See id. 
99 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11(c) to (d) (2006). 
100 Memorandum from the Ctr. for Law and the Pub. Health 2 (Sept. 15, 2005) 
(on file with the Duke Law and Technology Review), available at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/Katrina%20-
%20Federal%20PH%20Dec%20and%20IDRP.pdf. 
101 42 U.S.C. § 233(a)–(b) (2006). 
102 The Secretary of HHS has the authority to declare a public health emergency 
under § 319 of the Public Health Act. 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (2006).  
103 Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act, 46 App.U.S.C. §§ 181–89 (1851) 
(current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30503–12 (2006)).  
104 46 App.U.S.C. § 183 (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b) 
(2006)).  
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and the vessel owner could argue that there was no liability based on the 
lack of the value of the ship and its former contents.105 The Shipowners’ 
Limitation of Liability Act also requires the creation of a concursus of 
claims so that all claims are consolidated into a single federal case allowing 
the resolution of all claims subject to the limitation of liability and 
precluding future claims.106 However, the Shipowner’s Limitation of 
Liability Act affords protection only to seagoing vessel owners in the event 
of a disaster—whether terrorist or manmade.107 The owners of terminals, 
ports and platforms are left to traditional tort defenses.108 
¶35 Individual states can also issue Emergency and Administrative 
Orders to provide liability relief to the private sector during emergencies. 
After Hurricane Katrina, the Governor of Mississippi and the Governor of 
Louisiana each issued an order to provide incentives and the release of 
liability risk so that the private sector could work with the government to 
best address the impact of the storm.109 
                                                     
105 Limitation of liability for personal injury and death claims were not being 
included in the limitation of liability and are subject to a separate limit of $420 
per ton. See 46 App.U.S.C. § 183(b) (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C. 
§30506(b)); see also Christopher E. Carey, Maritime Transportation Security 
Act of 2002 (Potential Civil Liabilities and Defenses), 28 TUL. MAR. L. J. 295 
(2004). 
106 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 414 (1954). 
107 46 App.U.S.C. § 183 (1851) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b) 
(2006)). 
108 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006). The 
legislative response to the Exxon Valdez spill expressly included a limitation of 
liability provision precluding the vessel owner from availing itself of the more 
general relief afforded by the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act. See 
Robert Force & Jonathan M. Gutoff, Limitation of Liability in Oil Pollution 
Cases: In Search of Concursus or Procedural Alternatives to Concursus, 22 
TUL. MAR. L. J. 331 (1998).  
109 See Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure, Emergency Temporary 
Medical Licenses (M.D./ D.O./ D.P.M.) (Aug. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.msbml.state.ms.us/EmergencyLicensing.pdf; Louisiana State Board 
of Medical Examiners, Statement of Position: Bioterrorism and National 
Emergency Response (Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=4295. Additionally, the Louisiana 
Good Samaritan Law, La. R.S. § 9:2793, provides a level of immunity from civil 
liability for individuals providing medical services in cases of emergency. 
Accordingly, the Louisiana Medical Practice Act provides a specific exemption 
from licensure for “[t]he administration of first aid in cases of emergency.” La. 
R.S. § 37:1291. 
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CONCLUSION 
¶36 The SAFETY Act is a necessary and innovative legislative tool 
encouraging the development of anti-terrorism technologies and is “a vital 
tool for our government to remove barriers to full industry participation in 
finding new and unique technologies to combat an evolving enemy.”110 Yet, 
as noted by DHS, there has not been “enough done to take advantage of this 
powerful tool to spur new technologies and new systems.”111 With a better 
understanding of the tremendous benefits that SAFETY Act Designation 
and Certification can bring, applications are likely to increase. However, the 
promise of this important tool to better protect the United States falls short 
when considering that nation-wide disaster prevention and emergency 
preparedness concerns are not afforded the same incentives and protections. 
SAFETY Act-type legislation for natural disasters would create incentives 
for industry to invest and share knowledge regarding technology and 
measures that would enhance America’s ability to withstand the next 
homeland security crisis. 
¶37 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and 9/11 show that private sector 
expertise can prevent, deter, mitigate, respond to, and repair damage caused 
by such grave crises and disasters. Tort reform as found in the SAFETY Act 
and the PREP Act ensures the threat of liability will not deter potential 
manufacturers, service providers and others from developing, deploying, 
and commercializing technologies and services that could save lives. With 
over three years of operation under the Department of Homeland Security, 
an extension of the SAFETY Act to applying for benefits related to 
damages resulting from natural disasters should be smoother and easier and 
should be made available to the private sector to protect the United States, 
our industry and our communities further. 
                                                     
110 Testimony, supra note 4. 
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